![]() ![]() At this time, Ludendorff feared that Rennenkampf and the Russian army would join the fight. His forces also confined Samsonov's left to the frontier. ![]() While Ludendorff was unsure if the messages were real or not, Hindenburg altered the German eigth army's plan according to the intercept. Francois began his attack swiftly taking Soldau on the Russian border thus cutting off communication with Samsonov's center. The second message sent by Samsonov stated what he thought to be a German withdrawl to Tannenberg & beyond, and his enroute to chase the German forces. With both intercepts,Hoffmann hurried and handed Hindenberg and Ludendorff the messges. This was very important to the Germans because they could now be assured that asistance could not come to aide Samsonov and his men. ![]() It also stated that Rennenkampf marching plans were not to move towards the Russian 2nd army. The first message was from Rennenkampf and revealed the distances from his army and Somsonov's army. On his was back, Hoffmann passed two intellegence unciphered intercepts that had been transmitted by Rennenkampf and Samsonov. However, Francois agreed to attack Samsonov's left flank after both Hoffmann and Ludendorff visited Francois to repeat the order. On August 25, Hoffmann ordered Francois to attack Samsonov's left flank, but Francois rejected the ordered and instead planned to wait untill his artillery support was ready on the 27th. Somsonov was also unaware of what the Germans were doing and he continued with his plan to exterminate the German eigth army at the Vistula. While the Germans were setting up there trap, Samsonov was stricken with communication and supply problems and was completely unaware that Rennenkampf had stopped to recopperate and thought that he was still moving to the south-west. Lastly a fourth corps was instrructed to stay at the River Vistula to meet Samsonov and his army as they made their way North. Hindenburg's remaining two divisions under the command of Mackensen and Below were to await for the command to move South by foot to confront Samsonov's opposite right flank. General Hermann von Francois and his German I corps were then transported by rail to the far southwest to meet Samsonov and his Russian 2nd army's left wing. He was replaced by the agressive dueo Paul von Hindenburg (who was brought out of retirement at 66) and Erick Ludendorff whom arrived to east Prussia on August 23.Īpon their arrival, Hindenburg immetietly reversed Prittwitz decision to withdrawl and then decided to allow a plan of action prepared by Prittwitz deputy chief of operations Colonel Maximilian Hoffmann. Prittwitz would then be dismissed by German high command and be sent back to Berlin. After this defeat and in fear of being encircled, Prittwitz and his men retreated to the River Vistula. A few modifcations would be made to the Russian's plan after both Russian armies beat General Prittwitz and the German 8th army at the Battle of Gumbinnen. The two armies planned to have a combined assult against General Prittwitz and his German 8th army. While General Rennenkampf and the Russian 1st army would advance into Prussia through the North-East. The Russians plan to advance into Germany territory was for the Russian's 2nd army lead by General Samsonov to move into the western corner of Eastern Prussia. In this battle, the Germans successfully encircled Russian and troops causing them to surrender. The battle of Tannenberg was probably one of the most victorious battles of the first world war for the Germans. ![]()
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